In recent research work, two approaches to protect SAML based Federated Identity Management (FIM) against man-in-the-middle attacks have been proposed. One approach is to bind the SAML assertion and the SAML artifact to the public key contained in a TLS client certificate. Another approach is to strengthen the Same Origin Policy of the browser by taking into account the security guarantees TLS gives. In this work, we present a third approach which is of further interest beyond IDM protocols. By binding the SAML assertion to cryptographically derived values of the TLS session that has been agreed upon between client and the service provider, this approach provides anonymity of the browser while allowing Relying Party and Identity Provider to detect the presence of a manin-the-middle attack.
Introduction
In browser-based Federated Identity Management (FIM) protocols, data has to be transported from a trusted third party to the service provider with an intermediate step at the browser. The trusted third party-called Identity Provider (IP)-is asked to issue a security token that is valid for a fixed time period and permits access to some service (hosted by a service provider, in this context called Relying Party (RP)). This token is first transmitted to the browser and in a following step transfered to the RP. Data stored in the browser is susceptible to attacks on the Same Origin Policy (SOP) of the browser, like Cross Site Scripting (XSS) or dynamic pharming. Since the SOP relies on the Domain Name System (DNS), the data can also be accessed by a variety of spoofing attacks, from ARP and IP spoofing to DNS spoofing (Pharming). This even applies if sophisticated security measures are in place (e.g. see the latest attack on Microsoft's Cardspace [1] ).
Figure 1. Scheme of a common browser-based FIM protocol
Two approaches have been proposed for SAML based Federated Identity Management to counter these attack threats. The first approach is to bind the SAML assertion and the SAML artifact to the TLS client's certificate public key. It was proposed in [2] , [3] and has already been adapted for standardization [4] . The other approach is to combine the security of TLS with the browser's Same Origin Policy [5] . In this paper, we present a third approach which further enhances IDM protocols: We bind the SAML assertion to the TLS session that has been agreed upon between client and Relying Party (RP) and as a result rely the user authentication. Furthermore do we achieve security even in the case, when an adversary is able to impersonate the RP by presenting a valid (e.g. selfsigned), but different, certificate for the requested RP to the browser. We do so by including the public key as part of the SAML assertion.
Browser-based Federated Identity Management Protocols
The browser plays an important role in Federated Identity Management (FIM) standards/frameworks like Liberty Alliance [6] , SAML [7] , or Microsoft Cardspace [8] . This is due to the fact that he can be used as a platform-independent client application with a rich set of features, and a provably secure cryptographic functionality: SSL/TLS [9] , [10] .
Protocols realizable within the constraints of standard web browsers are called browser-based protocols. A common approach was (and still is) to let the user decide, if he wishes to access untrusted or unsecured data through the browser. But recent studies point out that average-skilled Internet users understand neither server certificates nor browsers' security indicators at all [11] , [12] , [13] . An adversary may fake the site and disclose the user's password ("phishing attacks"). Apart from that problem, another shortcoming is that the user either has to memorize a plethora of passwords (and frequently forgets about them; otherwise; it would be unnecessary to include a "Forgot your password" link in a web application), or use the same low-entropy password in most cases, thus making offline dictionary attacks feasible.
In order to alleviate such man-in-the-middle attacks, browser-based FIM protocols have been introduced, basically extending the widely adapted Kerberos protocol [14] for the use in open networks.
First migrations are peppered with severe problems (cf. [15] , [16] , [17] , [8] )and a first attempt to disburden from a client application and make use of browserbased capabilities alone are found in Microsoft's Passport protocol [18] . Unfortunately, it turned out that the protocol had some deficiencies [15] , [19] .
When the (secure) Kerberos protocol was adapted to the World Wide Web, several crucial changes had to be made to transform it into a browser-based protocol:
• User authentication and key agreement have been separated. Thus http cookies, hidden form fields, or URL based mechanisms, that contain security tokens are independant from TLS.
• There is no cryptographic trust relationship between the browser and token issuing servers. As any browser (even in Internet kiosks) is sufficient to execute the protocol, cryptographic identifiers (e.g. client certificates) or additional addons could not be used. The http cookie carries the authentication token and any party in possession of the cookie can impersonate the real owner of the token. In addition, some (unfounded) assumptions have been made, namely that users could somehow determine the authenticity of a web server on the basis of server certificate, and that the Domain Name System (DNS) is an authentic host name resolution protocol. In fact, various Certification Authorities (CAs) have stored their root certificates in browsers and are thus trusted per se. Weak issuing policies can be exploited by adversaries, as a single CA that is careless or corrupted could issue certificates for rogue servers.
Moreover, the browser enforces only a weak security policy. A crucial component in browsers is the Same Origin Policy (SOP). This policy states that web objects, in particular cookies, stored in a browser are accessible by other (active) web objects only under the condition that they are from the same domain. Thus, security policies of browsers heavily rely on DNS.However, many attacks on domain name resolution protocols are present in the wild, ranging from Javascript code that alters a router's configuration [20] to large scale DNS Cache Poisoning attacks [21] .
Another problem are cross site scripting (XSS) attacks. Due to shortcomings in the application, the adversary injects some malicious code into the response of the application server. Since the code is in the same security context, the SOP does not apply, and the malicious code can break free and access protected objects within the browser's DOM.
Attacks against FIM Protocols
The original Kerberos protocol and related three party schemes have been intensely studied without finding severe security deficiencies [22] , [23] . However, their browser-based offspring-federated identity management protocols-turned out to have some vulnerabilities: In addition to the above mentioned Microsoft Passport analyses of Kormann and Rubin [15] and Slemko [19] , Groß [16] analyzes SAML, an alternative single sign on protocol, and shows that the protocol is vulnerable to adaptive attacks where the adversary intercepts the authentication token contained in the URL. Groß makes use of the fact that browsers add the URL in a referrer tag into an HTTP response when they are redirected 1 . Hence, a man-in-the-middle adversary signaling the browser to redirect the request to a rogue server retrieves the authentication token from the referrer tag. The previously described flaw in the SAML protocol have led to a revised version of SAML. Groß and Pfitzmann analyzed this version, again finding the need for improvements [24] . Similar flaws have been found in the analysis of the Liberty single sign on protocol [6] due to Pfitzmann and Waidner. The authors point out some weaknesses in presence of man-in-the-middle attacks.
Our Contribution
We solve the above problems by presenting a stronger binding of SAML assertions to a specific TLS session. Thus we make use of the strong security guarantees TLS gives. Browser based protocols which employ these bindings are much closer to the original Kerberos protocol.
The main idea is to perform a TLS handshake even when contacting the RP for the first time (this makes sense since the requested data has restricted access). This session is characterized by a TLS master secret, which is only known to the browser and the RP. If the RP issues a redirect to the IP, the browser actively derives a value from this master secret, and sends it together with its authentication to the IP. (This value must not threaten the confidentiality of the master secret; this can be achieved e.g. by using a hash value of the master secret.) The IP now includes the derived value into the SAML assertion, and signs the assertion.
When the browser sends the SAML assertion to the RP, he must make sure to use the same TLS session as before. (This can be achieved by not releasing the TCP connection, or by re-using an old TLS session id and a fast TLS handshake.) The RP can now verify that the SAML assertion contains a derived value from the current TLS master secret. From this he can conclude that no man-in-the-middle attack occured in between client and RP.
To prevent man-in-the-middle attacks between client and IP, other means must be used. E.g. a special browser plugin, which automatically distinguishes between valid IP certificates and invalid ones, is sufficient. (This approach will not work for the link between client and RP, because there will be far too many RPs to give any strict rules on the validity of server certificates.)
Related Work
Groß and Pfitzmann propose the Janus profile for SAML artifacts [24] . Their idea is to employ two artifacts in a consistent way. In that case, a token is valid when it consists of both values. Thus, an adversary in possession of a single value cannot replay the token.
Holder-of-Key Web Browser SSO Profile [4] is a forthcoming SSO-profile, which uses the so called "Holder of Key" subject confirmation method according to [25, Section 3.1] and hence a cryptographic binding between the user and her assertion. A main motivation for this profile is the fact that the less secure "Bearer" methods may not be used for the higher security levels according to [26] . The Bearer method in practice means that a client accessing a secured resource at a service provider will be redirected to the inter-site transfer service at the identity provider. After visiting this service, the principal is transferred to the assertion consumer service at the service provider, where the client issues a POST request (with or without user intervention) to set the token. According to the Holder-of-Key profile the client has to authenticate himself using keys supplied through TLS (using client certificates) before issuing the POST request.
Organization
The paper is organized as follows: We start with describing SAML assertions and artifacts used in FIM protocols in Section 2. This is followed by a short introduction to TLS in Section 3. We then specify a refined SAML Browser Profile in Section 4, and discuss its integration with the existing SAML specifications in Section 5. Further, we provide a discussion on its capabilities and restrictions (Section 6), a security proof (Section 7), and some implementation issues (Section 8). Then we present two extensions of our scheme to counter specific attacks in case of a special active adversary, which have different requirements to the IP. Finally, we conclude in Section 10.
SAML Assertions and Artifacts for Federated Identity Management
SAML is an XML standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data between an Identity Provider (IP) and a Relying Party (RP). The syntax and semantics for XML-encoded assertions are defined in [27] . Several profiles are defined in [25] . The most important profile is the Browser SSO profile, which defines how to use SAML to provide the SSO with the client browser.
Before describing the operation mode of SAML, we first introduce the two SAML tokens used in this paper: SAML assertion and SAML artifact. A SAML assertion specifies the claims, and is specified by the saml:Assertion element defined as follows: The SAML version used is specified in saml:Version, the assertion's identifier in saml:ID, and the time of issuing in saml:IssueInstant. All these attributes are required.
The saml:Issuer element specifies the SAML authority that is making the claim(s) in the assertion (the IP). The assertion's saml:Subject defines the principal that owns all statements within the assertion. For browser-based FIM protocols, this is the browser, or the human user behind the browser, respectively. The identity of the Relying Party (RP) a SAML assertion is issued for is fixed in one or more specific saml:AudienceRestriction elements within the saml:Conditions element. They state that the given SAML assertion is only valid for use with one of the given RP endpoints. The saml: * Statement elements are used to specify user-defined statements relevant for the context of the SAML assertion.
In some cases, e.g. if an assertion cannot be sent via the browser due to size constraints, a SAML artifact is used to indicate where and how to retrieve the assertion. The artifact is specified by a string within a saml:Artifact element and has the format defined in [28] . The MessageHandle identifies the SAML assertion associated with this artifact. It should be a cryptographically strong random or pseudorandom value.
After the successful authentication of the user, the IP provides either a SAML assertion or only a SAML artifact (the corresponding assertion is located at the IP's artifact resolution service) to the browser. The received SAML token is then forwarded to the RP. See Figure 2 for an overview.
If the received token is a SAML artifact, the RP builds and sends a SAML saml:ArtifactResolve message containing the artifact to the IP's artifact resolution service endpoint (identified by the SourceID and EndpointIndex). The requested assertion is then placed within a saml:ArtifactResponse and sent to the RP.
After receiving the SAML assertion (resolved or not), the RP validates the enveloped XML signature. The assertion with valid signature is then examined by the RP to determine whether the client is allowed to access the specified resource in the RP.
Transport Layer Security
Transport Layer Security (better known as SSL/TLS [9] , [10] ) is the standard method to provide security functionality like privacy and data integrity in the world wide web. In a TLS handshake two parties agree upon a cryptographic encryption scheme and (at least partially) authenticate each other. Therefore, they derive a session key out of randomly chosen material that is exchanged between the two parties before.
After a TLS handshake has been completed successfully, both client and server know that they can now communicate with each other over a channel guaranteeing confidentiality and integrity of messages. Regarding the identities of their partner, they can rely on the following facts:
1) The client C knows that the server is a machine that knows a private key corresponding to the public key contained in the server certificate. We do not assume that the client is able to verify any other identities of the server such as Fully Qualified Domain Names, thus our protocol is resistant to attacks like Pharming combined with PKI spoofing. 2) If a CertificateVerify message has been sent by the client, the server may deduce that he is talking to a browser that knows the private key corresponding to the public key contained in the client certificate. 3) If the client is not authenticated, the server may nevertheless deduce that any data he sends to the TLS channel will reach exactly the same endpoint that the received data (e.g. a SAML assertion) originates from. 4) If in two consecutive TLS sessions the same master secret is used to derive the keys to protect the TCP byte stream, both communication endpoints (browser and server) may deduce that in the second session they are talking to the same entity as in the first session.
The first three facts have been used previously to construct secure bindings for SAML to TLS [5] : Here we use the last fact to construct a third binding. The idea is the following: If the browser adds a value derived from the master secret of a certain TLS session to his SAML Assertion request, and if this derived value is present in the SAML assertion, the RP may deduce that the other endpoint of the current TLS channel (i.e. the browser) requested this assertion from the IP. . The details of the encoding of this element depend on the binding, the options are HTTP Redirect Binding, HTTP POST Binding, and HTTP Artifact Binding (for details see [28] ). 3) Browser → IP : The browser sends the <AuthnRequest>-element to the Identity Provider using a simple HTTP GET or POST request. He adds a value dk to this request, derived from the TLS master secret of the current TLS connection with RP . (E.g. dk = Hash(mastersecret).) 4) IP : In absence of a previously established authenticated session, the Identity Provider authenticates the user according to the requirements of the Relying Party, which may be specified within the <RequestedAuthentication Context> element inside the <AuthnRequest> element using the authentication classes defined in [29] . 5) IP → Browser: Upon successful authentication, the Identity Provider issues a SAML assertion which contains dk (this value is covered by the XML signature) and returns a credential to the browser, depending on the used binding (see [28, 
SAML Assertions
In order to properly implement the proposed SAML protocol, it becomes necessary to slightly extend the syntax of a common SAML assertion (as defined in [27] ). Actually, the derived key dk from the TLS connection between browser and RP must be included both in a SAML assertion request (sent by the browser to the IP) and in the resulting SAML assertion (created by the RP). Both are to be described next.
SAML Assertion Request
The SAML core specification (Assertions and Protocols [27] ) already provides several extension points for specifying arbitrary extensions to SAML assertion requests. For the special purpose intended here, the most appropriate extension to our consideration consists in relying on the usage of the optional saml:Conditions element of the samlp:AuthnRequest element. It is used to provide the IP with conditions restricting the assertion's validity, which are to be included in the resulting SAML assertion. For example, it may be used to specify that the issued SAML assertion is only valid until a certain timestamp has passed (NotOnOrAfter) or that it can be used only once, immediately, and is invalidated on first use (<OneTimeUse>).
Thus, as each of these conditions are to be contained in the assertion issued, and thus must be fulfilled on assertion usage, we suggest to extend the samlp:AuthnRequest message with a new type of condition that restricts the issued assertion's usage on a certain TLS connection between browser and Relying Party. The TLSRestriction type extends the abstract saml:ConditionAbstractType of [27] , and defines a new element nds:TLSDerivedKey, which contains the derived value dk in Base64 encoding.
Once a browser has established a valid TLS connection to the Relying Party, it requests a new SAML assertion instant by sending an AuthnRequest message to its IP. Once the nds:TLSDerivedKey condition is used in the samlp: AuthnRequest, this advises the issuer to include it as-is in the assertion(s) it instantiates for this request. Thus, the dk value derived from the TLS connection between browser and Relying Party will be contained in the resulting SAML assertion token (shown in Figure 5 ). Furthermore, as the hole assertion is protected by a digital signature, the nds:TLSDerivedKey will be protected against any modification attempt and a cryptographically strong binding between the SAML assertion and the TLS connection between browser and Relying Party is established.
SAML Assertion Syntax
Then, once the browser receives the newly instantiated SAML assertion from the IP, it immediately delivers the assertion via the preexisting TLS connection to the Relying Party. As the Relying Party is capable of both verifying an IP's digital signature and comparing the nds:TLSDerivedKey value with the dk value derived from the TLS connection to the browser, it can perform the necessary verification tasks by itself and within a reasonable amount of additional workload. As a result, it can make a sound authorization decision based on cryptographically strong credentials.
Merits and Flaws
The proposed scheme provides cryptographically strong guarantees. Further, the protocol does not require any secrets to be stored within the browser. The computational overhead is low as only few altered protocol steps are needed compared to common SSO protocols. The token to identify a client is bound to a temporary TLS session only (instead of a permanent TLS client certificate [4] ), and therefore we can preserve anonymity of the browser.
In order to implement the proposed protocol, two additional steps are required. At first, read-access to the TLS master secret (or an appropriate value derived from the master secret) must be given for both client and server, and secondly, both parties also must have access to an identical hash value calculation algorithm.
The modified SAML Browser profile from Section 4 protects the connection between browser and Relying Party against attacks. It does not protect the connection between browser and Identity Provider: By acting as a man-in-the-middle between browser and identity provider, the attacker could exchange the value dk sent by the victim in step 3 with the value dk derived from the TLS connection between attacker and Relying Party. He then could intercept the SAML assertion or SAML artifact sent in step 5, and use it to authenticate against the RP. However, the connection between browser and IP can be protected by a variety of means, ranging from using a special browser extension which is capable of automatically verifying the IP server certificate, to the use of TLS client certificates to authenticate against the IP.
It is more difficult to secure the connection between browser and RP, because (a) TLS client certificates would be traceable across several RPs, thus creating privacy problems, and (b) a variety of TLS server certificates could be used by the different RPs.
On the downside of the approach stands that it requires a SAML assertion to be instantiated for about every login request. By setting multiple AudienceRestrictions, a SAML issuer may support SAML assertions that are valid for a set of RPs and can be reused within their timespan of validity. Omitting the AudienceRestriction elements completely may even grant unlimited access to a user, as long as the other conditions given in the assertion hold. However, since the derived key approach binds the use of the SAML assertion to a specific pre-existing TLS connection, that SAML assertion is rendered unusable for all other-legitimate-RPs listed within (unless they are located on the same server). This flaw puts additional load to the IP, since it is forced to issue way more SAML assertions than without the derived key technique. However, this comes to the benefit of improved security guarantees. Besides that, it may be questionable if real-world applications really are frequently required to do simultaneous logins to disjunct systems within the lifetime of a single SAML assertion. Nevertheless, additional investigations regarding SAML assertions containing multiple derived keys instead of a single one are to be performed as part of our ongoing work.
Security Proof
In the following we first define some assumptions for our poposed protocol in Theorem 1. Then we sketch a proof of security for our protocol under this theorem. Theorem 1. Assume that the connection between browser and IP is secure against attacks, that the received value dk = Hash(mastersecret browser−RP ), and that all parties follow the protocol from Section 4. Then this protocol is secure against man-in-the-middleattacks on the connection between browser and RP.
Proof: If the Relying Party receives a SAML assertion that contains a value dk that matches the computed value of Hash(mastersecret browser−RP ), he may conclude the following:
• mastersecret browser−RP is only known to RP and one unique, but anonymous browser. Thus dk can only be computed by RP, or by this unique browser.
• Since RP did not send dk to IP, RP may conclude that this unique browser has sent dk to IP.
• RP may additionally conclude that this unique browser successfully authenticated itself (or/and the user behind the browser) to IP. (Otherwise the SAML assertion would not have been issued.) • Since dk only matches Hash(mastersecret browser−RP ) if the two endpoints of the current TLS session are the unique browser and RP, and since a single TLS instance is secure against man-in-themiddle attacks, RP may conclude that the unique, anonymous browser from which he received the SAML assertion indeed successfully authenticated against IP, and may thus grant access to the requested ressource.
Implementation Issues
Since the master secret is the central secret value in each TLS session, it must be protected in the browser from access by scripts or browser plugins. The same holds for TLS implementations in web servers.
Thus in both cases, a minor modification of the TLS implementation itself is required: After successful establishment of a master secret, a derived value that does not compromise the secrecy of the master secret must be made accessible to scripting languages or programming languages like JAVA through a defined interface.
Active Adversary Attacks
The proposed solution heavily depends on XML technology. Hence, we remark that without proper treatment of the particular XML security standards we cannot exclude some additional vulnerabilities existing due to weaknesses in the XML standards and/or their implementation (see e.g. [30] ). Our approach so far is already fending all cases of eavesdropping adversaries, so in this chapter we will additionally examine a special case, namely active adversary attacks between the browser and RP or IP, respectively, in possession of some valid certificate (e.g. self-signed) for the embodied party. This special case leads to an extension of our proposed scheme.
Remark: This attack is not an attack on TLS itself but merely on the fact that one could allow unsecure certificates in certain situations. Under the assumption that an adversary cannot guess or compute the private key according the public key contained in the targeted server's certificate, and that we only trust certificates issued by trusted CAs, we remain secure against active man-in-the-middle attacks.
Active Adversary between Browser and IP
One can easily see that an active adversary between browser and IP does not have any advantage to a passive adversary. We differ between two cases: either the adversary is in possession of the proper private key associated to the certificate of IP, or the adversary is in possession of a self-signed certificate similar to the real certificate of IP (along with the corresponding keys). We estimate the probability of the first case as negligible and require that if a browser encounters a self-signed certificate for an IP it aborts the connection.
We conclude that active adversary attacks in this setting are only possible under very strong assumptions on the adversary's capabilites (i.e. having access to the IP's private key).
Active Adversary between Browser and RP
In this scenario, the assumption is that there exists some RP possessing only self-signed certificates. As a result, the browser cannot abort the connection if such a certificate is encountered. We introduce Lemma 1, which will later be used for construction of the master secret by the adversary. Lemma 1. Given a pseudorandom function f (x) = y with x being the input parameter and y the output, then
A man-in-the-middle (in the following we call this adversary Eve or E) could now perform the following attack:
1) E waits for the browser to establish a connection to RP. Then, E acts as a man-in-the-middle and impersonates RP. 2) E notes the random value sent by the browser along with the session id (client.hello), and establishes herself a secure connection to the real RP, using these received values. 3) Once the RP has sent it's random value (server.hello), E passes on the same values to the browser.
4)
In the ClientKeyExchange message, the browser sends an encrypted premaster secret to E, which is again passed to the real RP (reencrypted by E for the real RP). 5) According to Lemma 1 and [31] , the connection between E and the RP now is secured with the same master secret as the connection between the browser and E, as all inputs to the PRF computing the master secret have been chosen accordingly. 6) After receiving the SAML Assertion bound to dk, E is granted access to RP. This follows from the fact that using the same master secret leads to the computation of the same derived value as well. To counter this kind of attacks, two options arise. One could enforce the use of CA-signed certificates for all Relying Parties or one could ensure that the SAML Assertion is valid only for the endpoint the client is connected to. We propose an extension of the original approach in the following section, in which we "fix" the client's endpoint, so the Assertion issued by the IP becomes invalid when trying to be used with any endpoint other than the one the client is connected to.
Extended SAML Assertion using Endpoint Fixation
To ensure that a SAML Assertion cannot be used by an adversary as described in section 9.2, we bind the Assertion's validity to the RP to which the browser is connected to. We do so by forwarding the public key extracted from the TLS connection between browser and RP (or, in the adversarial model, E) together with d k to the IP for inclusion in the issued SAML Assertion. Hence, the IP can check the public key against a database including all public keys of all registered RPs, and the original RP can later on verify that the public key contained in the Assertion matches its own (and hence detect such man-in-the-middle attacks). However, we remark that it is an additional effort for the IP to maintain such a public key database in order to be able to match received public keys against expected keys.
We now differ between two cases: a) the adversary is impersonating the RP and behaves as described in 9.2, or b) the adversary remains passive until the browser has received the Assertion from the IP, and then tries to impersonate the RP.
In the first case, E may succeed in "distributing" the same master secret for the connections browser-to-E and E-to-RP. She could then pass on the Assertion from the browser to RP, but as the Assertion contains the public key used by the adversary, RP will not accept it and abort the connection. As described in section 5, the data contained in the Assertion is signed by the IP, and the adversary is not able to alter the public key to validate the Assertion afterwards.
In the second case, E cannot establish herself as man-in-the-middle between browser and RP, as she does not have any information regarding the master secret (and therefore the derived key d k ) computed by the browser/RP. However, to be able to authenticate to the RP, E would have to use the same master secret, thus resulting in a failed attack attempt. Figure 6 shows the extended Browser Profile. Figure 7 shows an example of a SAML assertion containing both the derived key d k and the Relying Party's public key as used in the TLS connection to the Browser. This way, the Relying Party can verify that the Browser is part of the same TLS session, hence it can verify that no man-in-the-middle attack based on other certificates is going on.
Optimizing Modifications. In opposition to the model described, requiring a database held by the IP, we also present a "stateless" solution. To achieve this goal, the browser includes the public key of the contacted RP in the derivation function, resulting in the derived key now being dependant on the master secret of the TLS session and the public key of the RP. This solution is easier to achieve, as it does not require the IP to know all recent public keys of all registered RPs, and no additional overhead occurs (compared to sending the public key along with a derived value all the time).
However, this approach implies giving up the ability of the IP to control the browser's connections before issuing any token. However, this does not influence the security of the proposed solution, as an adversary using a public key different than the one from the original RP cannot use a token issued for her public key to gain access to the real RP.
Malicious Protocol Participants
In order to give a complete analysis of all adversary scenarios it becomes necessary to also consider the case of a malicious or corrupted protocol participant.
If the Relying Party itself is operated by the adversary, or if it got compromised (e.g. via malware; it even suffices for the adversary to gain access to the private key corresponding to certificate of RP [32] ), the security implications to the overall protocol obviously are tremendous. Since the RP hosts the service that the browser wants to access, it can decide by itself to execute that service, regardless of whether a browser actually triggered its execution or not. In the same line, it can decide on incoming service requests placed by any browser on whether these are to be performed as intended, not performed, or misused to perform any other services. Hence, the given SMLbased SSO protocol is rendered completely useless in such scenarios.
More interesting is the case of a malicious IP. First of all, since it owns the property of being a trusted third party of both browser and RP, its corruption or maliciousness implies a fundamental flaw in the overall system. Being the security token issuer, an IP can obviously also create arbitrary SAML assertions for himself. Since the Relying Party is not able to verify the validity of such tokens-besides verifying its legitimation from the IP-it will accept them. This enables the IP to hijack the identity of every individual to perform every kind of request on every RP that relies on the IP. Then given approach of using derived keys in SAML assertions is not able to mitigate this threat, besides that it requires the IP to stick to the protocol, i.e. instantiate a TLS connection, derive a key, and create a SAML assertion token containing that derived key. However, since the RP is not able to differentiate between the IP and an arbitrary browser, this puts no real restrictions to a malicious or compromised IP.
Last but not least, a malicious or compromised browser induces some level of uncertainty to the propsed derived key approach. There are two different threats here that must be differentiated. The first consists in that the individual using the browser may try to trigger a service execution it is not allowed to perform. However, this threat is fend completely with the usage of SAML assertions, since those explicitly list all actions a user is allowed or prohibited to do at a certain Relying Party. This protection mechanism is not affected by adding a derived key to the SAML assertion token.
The second threat consists in an adversary that tries to "steal" the login credential from the browser. Alternatively, the browser's user may try to pass an issued SAML token to another, unauthorized entity, in order to share access rights without RP's permission. An example for such a setting would be a flatrate-style accounting for RP's services, where each user that paid its bill is allowed to access, but is not allowed to pass its login credentials to other users. In the plain SAML scenario, a malicious browser may issue a SAML token, then pass that valid SAML token to its unauthorized peer, who then can use it to perform the particular services on the RP. Using the derived key approach, a SAML token is bound to a specific TLS session, hence it can not be used by other entities than the browser that originally issued it. However, the browser can still act as a proxy, channeling requests from the unauthorized entity to the Relying Party using its own TLS connection. Nevertheless, this requires active involvement of the malicious/compromised browser, hence is way more complicated than simple token forwarding.
To conclude, the derived key approach is not preventing attacks in the presence of malicious protocol participants. It may only pose minor restrictions to what a malicious protocol participant must stick to when performing an attack.
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a novel TLS binding for SAML assertions. This binding creates a cryptographically strong dependency between a certain SAML assertion and a TLS channel, thus achieving a binding between a level 5 (application) and a level 4 (transport) protocol according to the ISO/OSI reference model. By embedding a cryptographic value that was derived from a TLS session's master secret into a SAML Assertion token, we enable the Relying Party to determine whether the SAML Assertion was issued for the same Browser that tries to trigger a particular service execution. This way, the approach renders the confidentiality requirement for SAML Assertions to be no longer necessary.
Since the approach is a generic one, it is also applicable to other scenarios where cryptographic protocols are operating in different levels of a protocol stack. Future research hence may cover its adaptation to other application-level security mechanisms like e-mail protection or secure HTTP cookies. Either way, the clear advantage of the presented approach consists in that it effectively counters most kinds of attacks that deal with credential theft, with a minimal footprint in terms of complexity and overhead.
